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<CN>6 
<CT>The Abolition of God 
<epi> 
Ah, but a man’s reach should exceed his grasp, 
Or what’s a heaven for? 
  Robert Browning, Andrea del Sarto 
</epi> 
 
<A>The Three Impostors 
 
The book’s existence had been rumoured for centuries. Finally, in 1680, Of the Three Great 
Impostors appeared in print, issued by an impeccably respectable Lutheran publisher in the 
city of Kiel. It was a tease, of course. Christian Kortholt, the city’s theology professor and the 
book’s author, was not in fact denouncing Moses, Christ and Muhammad, but a newer trio: 
two Englishmen and a Dutchman. These three impostors were the seventeenth century’s 
equivalent of the twenty-first century’s New Atheist ‘four horsemen’: symbols of a wider 
shift in the mood, and signs to be spoken against.1 Between them, they sum up the gathering 
changes we have been tracing in this book, changes which, by the second half of the 
seventeenth century, were emerging into the open. 
 The least-known member of Kortholt’s trio is Edward Herbert, baron of Cherbury, 
whose modern reputation has been eclipsed by his younger brother, the poet George Herbert. 
The two brothers were close, but could hardly have been more different. The quiet, sickly 
                                               
1 Christian Kortholt the elder, De tribus impostoribus magnis liber (Kiel: Joachim Reumann, 1680). On the 
legend of The three impostors, see above, pp. XX–XX. The ‘four horsemen’ label was applied to the like-
minded atheists Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris and Christopher Hitchens in 2007 in the wake of 
a much-watched video discussion between them. 
George was a famously devoted pastor, firmly but irenically Protestant. Edward was a 
scholar, but also a politician, diplomat, courtier, musician and, not least, a bold and 
accomplished soldier, quick-tempered and sometimes recklessly frank. It was while serving 
as English ambassador in Paris that he published On Truth (1624), a shockingly sceptical 
philosophical essay. However, he was prudent enough not to openly question Christianity, 
and the more candid autobiography he wrote soon after remained unpublished while he lived. 
When civil war broke out in 1642 Herbert, now in his sixties, refused to take sides. Instead, 
he retired to work on what would become his last great book, On Pagan Religion, finished in 
1645. He died three years later: the book remained unpublished until 1663. 
 Between them, the autobiography and On Pagan Religion show how Herbert earned 
his place in Kortholt’s axis of atheism. From his boyhood onwards, Herbert tells us, ‘a great 
number of doubts began to occur to me’. It is by now a familiar story. His particular 
stumbling block was the moral one. He could not reconcile the doctrine of Hell with his 
intuition that, if a sinner ‘did not mean infinitely to offend . . . God will not inflict an infinite 
punishment upon him’. Likewise, he found Calvinist predestination impossible to believe, 
since it consisted of ‘base and unworthy thoughts about the most gracious and good God’. 
Some would have fought back against the dreadful temptation of these thoughts. Herbert was 
more inclined to follow where they led him. While still a teenager, he tried to puzzle out the 
real truth of religion, making use of a favourite anti-atheist argument: that every human 
society had acknowledged gods. If that is so, he wondered, what characteristics are common 
to human religion in every age and every country? If the local oddities of each religion could 
be scraped away, perhaps he could reveal beneath them doctrines ‘so universally taught that 
they were not questioned or doubted in any . . . religion’.2 The treatise on pagan religion, 
                                               
2 Edward Herbert of Cherbury, Pagan Religion: A Translation of De religione gentilium, ed. John Anthony 
Butler (Binghampton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1996), 51–3; Edward Herbert of 
then, was not merely a historical exercise. Herbert was sinking mineshafts to confirm that he 
had found bedrock. 
 His actual conclusions now seem rather bland. He became convinced that all religions 
taught that there is a God who deserves worship, who commands virtue and who both 
rewards and punishes humanity. These became the ‘articles’ of his faith. Herbert has been 
called the father of deism, but proper deists would have found all this disappointingly 
conventional. Two things gave it a dangerous edge. One, ironically, was Herbert’s discretion. 
His own religious practice, he explained, was to hold to those core ‘articles’, but also, as best 
he could, to ‘embrace and believe all that the Church in which I was born and brought up did 
uniformly teach’. Conforming to the Church of England was his duty as a patriotic 
Englishman. But since that church’s doctrines went far beyond his ‘articles’, he believed its 
teachings ‘either piously upon the Authority of the Church, or at least doubting piously when 
proofs were not sufficiently made and confirmed unto me’.3 
This was Montaigne’s fideism reworked for an unbeliever. Rather than simply 
submitting to the Church’s authority, he left open the option of ‘doubting piously’: that is, 
conforming outwardly with inner mental reservation. Some unbelievers concealed their 
doubts cynically. Herbert had found a way of doing so on principle, and the principle was 
capable of quietly hollowing out whole churches. ‘Doubting piously’ perhaps makes him a 
truer ancestor of modern Anglicanism than his poet brother. 
That dangerous conformity sat uneasily alongside Herbert’s response to the obvious 
problem with his system. If those core ‘articles’ are humanity’s universal religion, why is it 
that every actual human society has embellished them with so many other doctrines and 
                                               
Cherbury, The Life of Edward, First Lord Herbert of Cherbury written by himself, ed. J. M. Shuttleworth 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 25, 29. 
3 Herbert of Cherbury, Life, 30–1. 
ceremonies? Herbert knew exactly who to blame for this: ‘That race of clever priests who . . . 
thought that they could dazzle peoples’ minds . . . [and] expected to get more profit and larger 
allowances for themselves from the various rites, ceremonies, and sacred mysteries which 
they invented.’ In particular, he claimed, the controversial and divisive doctrines which had 
so often caused religious strife were created by priests in a deliberate attempt to stir up 
mutual hatreds and so to entrench their own power. Ancient pagan priesthoods had done it 
and, he believed, Christian priests did exactly the same. So Herbert’s core articles of faith are 
universal principles, but religion, explicitly including Christianity, is a conspiracy.4 Anxious 
doubts and moral outrage had joined forces. Herbert took the Machiavellian claim that 
religion is a political trick and dressed it in pious clothing. He was wise not to publish any of 
this in his lifetime. 
 Kortholt’s second Englishman was less discreet. Thomas Hobbes was so notorious 
that ‘he cannot walk the streets, but the Boys point at him saying, There goes Hobbes the 
Atheist!’ It was probably not exactly true. Hobbes conformed outwardly to the Church of 
England for most of his life, and may even have attended its traditional worship in the 1650s, 
when it was illegal to do so. But his reported claim that he ‘liked the religion of the church of 
England best of all other’ sounds more like an aesthetic choice than a confession of faith. 
Perhaps he shared Herbert’s ethic of ‘doubting piously’. He certainly shared Herbert’s dislike 
of priests. His reported comment to the clergy of various denominations who pestered him on 
his sickbed – ‘Let me alone, or else I will detect all your cheats from Aaron [the founder of 
the Jewish priesthood] to yourselves’ – could have come from Herbert. The sustained vitriol 
                                               
4 Herbert of Cherbury, Pagan Religion, 52, 285, 339, 350. 
of the fourth and final section of his Leviathan (1651), an extended howl of rage against the 
Catholic clergy under the title ‘The Kingdom of Darkness’, makes Herbert look mild.5 
 Hobbes’ reputation for atheism rested chiefly on Leviathan, and especially on the half 
of the book which is supposedly devoted to religion. His attack on biblical authority became 
notorious: no one had ever denied in print before that the Bible’s first five books were written 
by Moses. But as ever, this was not about disinterested biblical scholarship.6 Hobbes’ two-
pronged attack on both biblical and clerical authority has something Seekerish about it. His 
persistent theme throughout the religious passages of Leviathan is the impossibility of certain 
religious knowledge. No human claim about God – whether made by priests or by the Bible’s 
human authors – is or can ever be beyond question, even if apparently authorised by miracles. 
Private individuals, including churchmen, may believe such claims, but they cannot force 
anyone else to agree. They can only persuade, as the first apostles did. Seekers used this 
sense of provisionality to argue that no religion was possible. Hobbes gave the argument a 
simple twist. He had spent the first half of his book arguing for the absolute sovereignty of 
secular governments. He now claimed that, since absolute religious truth is unknowable, 
secular governments’ sphere of control ought to extend over religion too. He does not argue 
that they have some secret religious knowledge: merely that they are no more likely to be 
wrong than anyone else, and that no one can prove that they are wrong. He is particularly 
hostile to any notion of a separate spiritual authority. ‘Temporal and spiritual government, 
are but two words brought into the world, to make men see double, and mistake their lawful 
                                               
5 Patricia Springborg, ‘Hobbes on Religion’ in Tom Sorell (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 346–80; Alan Cromartie, ‘The God of Thomas Hobbes’, 
Historical Journal 51.4 (2008), 857–79. 
6 The same goes for the slightly earlier denial of Moses’ authorship in Isaac la Peyrère’s Pre-Adamitae, written 
in 1641 but not published until 1655: la Peyrère ‘wanted to raise a basic kind of religious scepticism about 
Scripture in order to justify his own religious views’, namely a weird doctrine of human polygenesis. Popkin, 
History of Scepticism, 221–3. 
sovereign.’ A professedly Christian sovereign is ‘the supreme pastor of his own subjects’ as 
well as their ruler: not because God can be assumed to have put him in power, but because 
the mere fact of being in power bestows on itself religious as well as political authority. 
Hobbes does allow that ‘belief and unbelief can never follow men’s commands’, but only in 
the most minimal sense. Governments cannot regulate beliefs, but they can absolutely 
regulate speech and outward action. If all other truths are provisional, political power is all 
that remains.7 
 Looked at through one eye, this is an anticlerical variant of Montaigne’s fideism, or 
indeed a natural extension of the ‘Anglican’ position, associated with the Elizabethan 
theologian Richard Hooker, that monarchs in Parliament have authority not only over the 
bodies but the consciences of their subjects.8 But through the other eye, it is the royalist 
caricature of Parliamentarian relativism – ‘Is there a God? Let it be put to vote!’9 – come to 
life, or else an attempt to turn Machiavellian cynicism into something praiseworthy. It is not 
merely that Hobbes believed that religious truth was fundamentally inaccessible, a view that 
the Seekers shared. What is truly shocking is that this did not trouble him. He had apparently 
left anxiety behind him. He does seem to have believed that there is a God – otherwise we 
have to dismiss an implausible amount of his writing as a smokescreen – but he was not 
especially interested in the question, except insofar as he was suspicious of anyone claiming 
to act in God’s name. The deity he truly revered was political power, the Leviathan itself. The 
reputation for atheism that this won him was not unjust. But his ideas were easier to condemn 
than to refute. 
                                               
7 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Michael Oakeshott (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946), esp. 306, 327, 357. 
8 Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity: Preface, Books I to IV, ed. Georges Edelen (Cambridge, 
MA: Belknap Press, 1977), esp. 32–3. 
9 See above, p. XX. 
 Herbert and Hobbes, important as they are, were mere supporting players to 
Kortholt’s third impostor. If modern atheism has a single acknowledged intellectual founder, 
it is Baruch Spinoza. According to the foremost modern historian of Enlightenment 
radicalism, Jonathan Israel, ‘no one else . . . remotely rivalled Spinoza’s notoriety’, and with 
good reason: 
<Q> 
Spinoza’s prime contribution to the evolution of early modern Naturalism, fatalism, 
and irreligion . . . was his ability to integrate within a single coherent or ostensibly 
coherent system, the chief elements of ancient, modern and oriental ‘atheism’. No one 
else in early modern times did this, or anything comparable. . . . [He] fundamentally 
and decisively shaped a tradition of radical thinking which eventually spanned the 
whole continent. 
</Q> 
At first glance Spinoza seems to belong to a different story from the one this book has been 
telling: a Dutch Jewish philosopher whose journey towards radicalism began when he 
questioned his own community’s orthodoxies in 1655, at the age of twenty-two. The 
following year he was expelled from the Amsterdam synagogue. These early clashes 
eventually bore fruit in his Theologico-Political Treatise (1670), a devastating attack on the 
authority of the Bible, on any notion of the supernatural, on any attempt to override human 
reason and, in particular, on clerical authority or any kind of theocracy – a preoccupation he 
shared with Hobbes, although he was also very critical of Hobbes’ political absolutism. 
Spinoza’s claim that ‘nature is self-moving, and creates itself’ was not atheistic in the strict 
sense – it is closer to pantheism – but his reputation as the founding father of modern unbelief 
is well deserved.10 
 For our story, Spinoza’s significance lies in what happened after he was 
excommunicated in 1656: he fell in with Amsterdam’s most intellectually open religious 
community, Adam Boreel’s Collegiants. He did so at a moment of particular religious flux, 
when a pair of English Quaker missionaries had come to Amsterdam, and the Collegiants 
recognised the Quakers’ ‘inner light’ as congruent with their own quasi-mystical commitment 
to ‘reason’. The young Spinoza quickly became a part of this milieu. He collaborated with the 
Quaker missionary Samuel Fisher, working with him to translate an early Quaker pamphlet 
into Hebrew, in the (vain) hope of winning Jewish converts: it was Spinoza’s first ever 
published work. In 1660, Fisher wrote a long, chaotic but incisive attack on biblical authority 
which anticipated many of Spinoza’s later arguments: there is no knowing who learned what 
from whom, but plainly the two men were intellectually close. In 1658 another Quaker 
missionary wrote that Spinoza was ‘very friendly’ to their cause. The influence was not 
forgotten. Crucial chapters of the Theologico-Political Treatise borrowed from the Quaker 
Margaret Fell. But by then, Spinoza’s friendship with the Quakers had fallen foul of a bitter 
rupture between the Quakers and the Collegiants. The root of the quarrel was not, as is still 
sometimes suggested, that Collegiant rationalism and Quaker mysticism were polar 
opposites, but that they were so nearly the same thing that their remaining differences were 
intolerable. Even so, Spinoza cleaved to his Collegiant friends, in particular to one Pieter 
Balling, who would translate Spinoza’s first original book into Dutch. Spinoza remained 
personally close to Balling and to several other leading Collegiants throughout his life. When 
                                               
10 Israel, Radical Enlightenment, 159–60, 230; cf. the similarly pivotal role Spinoza plays in Gray, Seven Types 
of Atheism, 147–52. 
he moved out of Amsterdam in 1660–1, he chose as his rural refuge the village of Rijnsburg, 
the heartland of the Collegiant movement, founded there four decades earlier.11 
 Spinoza was never a Christian. But he was a Collegiant fellow-traveller: an affinity 
which would never have required him to contemplate anything so crassly carnal as a baptism. 
His early critique of both Christianity and Judaism was very much of a piece with the 
Collegiant, Seeker and Quaker critique of ‘religion’. The philosophical heft he brought to the 
table was new, but the moral force behind it was not. A vital part of this is that, despite or 
perhaps because of his Jewish background, Spinoza had an extraordinarily positive view of 
Jesus, whom he called ‘not so much the prophet as the mouthpiece of God’. He 
unproblematically used the momentous title Christ for him – no small step for a Jew to take – 
and repeatedly emphasised that Jesus’ teaching and moral vision were so far above anyone 
else’s that ‘the voice of Christ may be called the voice of God’. For all his biblical 
scepticism, he was happy to accept the basic accuracy of the Christian Gospels. The main 
exception to that is his blanket rejection of miracle stories, but here, too, his reasoning was 
driven more by theology and ethics than by any quasi-scientific scepticism. The reason he 
believed that ‘nature cannot be contravened’ was because the alternative is ‘to assert that God 
has created nature so weak . . . that he is repeatedly compelled to come afresh to her aid’: 
miracles were theologically incoherent. In fact, because a miracle would be ‘in contravention 
to God’s nature and laws . . . belief in it would throw doubt upon everything, and lead to 
atheism’.12 Any Collegiant or Seeker might have said the same. 
                                               
11 Fix, Prophecy and Reason, 151–5, 193, 200, 203; Richard H. Popkin, ‘Spinoza’s Relations with the Quakers 
in Amsterdam’, Quaker History 73.1 (1984), 14–28; Karen Clausen-Brown, ‘Spinoza’s Translation of Margaret 
Fell and his Portrayal of Judaism in the Theological-Political Treatise’, The Seventeenth Century 34.1 (2019), 
89–106. 
12 Richard H. Popkin, ‘Spinoza and Bible Scholarship’ in James E. Force and Richard H. Popkin (eds), The 
Books of Nature and Scripture (Dordrecht-Boston-London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), 15; Erdozain, 
 In 1662 Pieter Balling, Spinoza’s translator and friend, published a remarkable little 
Dutch book titled The Light upon the Candlestick, translated into English the following year. 
Starting from the impossibility of finding religious certainty in any church or sect, Balling 
exhorted each reader instead ‘to turn into the Light that’s in him’. Like Dirck Volckerstz 
Coornhert, whom we met in chapter three, Balling deliberately avoided citing the Bible at any 
point in his text: he wanted Reason to stand unaided. At most, he allowed for the possibility 
that some readers might, by means of the light within them, recognise ‘the Book called the 
BIBLE’ as having ‘an harmony with . . . God’. As to what this ‘light’ is, he stated breezily 
that ‘it’s all one to us whether ye call it Christ, the Spirit, the Word, etc.’, but he makes clear 
that ultimately this ‘light’ is moral intuition. ‘It is properly the nature of this Light infallibly 
to discover sin and evil.’13 
 The book has caused considerable confusion – Balling wrote it as an intervention in 
the hairsplitting Collegiant–Quaker dispute, but it is so close to Quakerism that it has often 
been mistaken for a Quaker text. Its real importance, however, is that this is the point where 
Seekerism and Spinozism met and meshed, and the Anglo-Dutch ferment of Protestant doubt 
and questioning that had been coming to a simmer for decades reached boiling point. The 
book allows for virtually nothing recognisable as Christianity, Judaism or even ‘religion’. Yet 
the mystical rationalism that it advocates is driven, above all, by the strength of its moral 
vision. And even as it rejected every trace of ‘religion’ as the word was normally understood, 
the book’s final words lambasted ‘all fools that say in their heart there is no God’.14 
 
                                               
The Soul of Doubt, 90, 97–9, 108, 112, 114; Baruch Spinoza, The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza, ed. R. H. 
M. Elwes (New York: Dover, 1951), vol. I, 83–4, 87. 
13 [Pieter Balling], The Light upon the Candlestick, trans. Benjamin Furley (London: for Robert Wilson, 1663), 
4–5, 10; Fix, Prophecy and Reason, 200–3.  
14 As this makes clear, Balling may not have cited the Bible, but he was ready enough to quote it unattributed: 
[Balling], The Light upon the Candlestick, 13. 
<A>From Then to Now, I: Anger 
 
And so the years around 1660 are when our main story ends: for this is when unbelief finally 
came out into the open and claimed philosophical respectability for itself. The intellectual 
history of atheism that follows from then until now is both important and fascinating, but we 
should not let it fool us. Behind and beneath it lies the deeper, emotional history we have 
been tracing. Its two streams now mingled and reinforced one another. On one side was the 
stream of anger: the unbelief of suspicion and defiance, refusing to be taken in or ordered 
around by priests and their God. That kind of unbelief was eyecatching, but it only became 
dangerous when it began to assert an ethical framework of its own. The Reformation, by 
choosing scepticism as its key religious weapon, in effect required believers to transition to a 
different kind of post-sceptical faith, a journey many of them struggled to complete. 
Protestants expected their faith to be settled and assured, but their intense self-reflectiveness 
sometimes made this desperately difficult to achieve. Hence the surge in the second 
emotional stream of unbelief: the stream of anxiety, in which earnestly pious men and women 
found themselves beset with fears and uncertainties which could not be reasoned away, 
because they were not in the end based on reason. Instead, some of these unwilling sceptics 
dealt with their anxieties in the classic Protestant way: by turning their doubts into a tool, and 
using it to dig down in the hope of rebuilding their faiths on a sound footing. As their 
anxieties dissolved one certainty after another, they were left with nothing except their 
commitment to their moral vision, which increasingly seemed not only to be Christianity’s 
heart but also – as the Renaissance humanists had unwittingly implied – to be detachable 
from the Christian tradition itself. They turned that moral intuition against the tradition that 
had taught it to them, critiquing Christianity for its failure to embody the ethics of Jesus 
Christ. And so the two streams came together. The moral force of the unbelief of anger and 
the moral urgency of the unbelief of anxiety mixed into a gathering flow of insistent, ethically 
driven doubts that began carving Christendom’s old-established landscape into something 
new. 
 This is a Protestant-led story, but it could not be confined to the Protestant world. 
Catholics’ and Protestants’ existential struggle held them in lockstep with one another. For a 
sign of how the same currents were tugging on Catholicism, consider Blaise Pascal, whose 
complex, passionate Catholicism was aligned with the unorthodox, Calvinist-influenced 
movement known as Jansenism. We have already met his very particular perspective on the 
seventeenth century’s anxieties about religious certainty. His treatise against atheism was 
never completed, and perhaps never could have been: the hundreds of fragments he prepared 
towards it were published under the bland title Pensées a few years after his death in 1662. A 
dominant theme of these ‘thoughts’ is the futility of argument. Philosophical proofs ‘are so 
remote from human reasoning and so involved that they make little impact’, even if you 
could be sure of the reliability of your own logic. As to arguments for God from nature, he 
points out that the Bible never tries to make that case. Such ‘proofs’ may be edifying for 
believers, but telling actual atheists that God is self-evident in nature ‘is giving them cause to 
think that the proofs of our religion are indeed feeble. . . . Nothing is more likely to bring it 
into contempt in their eyes.’ He is not claiming that nature proves there is not a God. It is 
worse than that: nature is ambiguous. It gives us ‘too much to deny and not enough to 
affirm’, so leaving us merely with ‘doubt and anxiety’. For Pascal, those lost in this trackless 
desert should give up their doomed mirage-chasing, and wait for their only hope of escape: a 
divine guide. 
<Q> 
We know the truth not only through our reason but also through our heart . . . Those 
to whom God has given religious faith by moving their hearts are very fortunate . . . 
but to those who do not have it we can only give such faith through reasoning, until 
God gives it by moving their heart, without which faith is only human and useless for 
salvation. 
</Q> 
There is no point, said the mathematical giant of his age, in relying on the ‘mathematical 
mind’. For all its achievements that mind struggles reliably to discern truths. The ‘intuitive 
mind’ would have to serve instead.15 
 This counsel of despair mirrors his Protestant counterparts’ conclusion: in the end, 
either you see God or you don’t. Either way, reasoned arguments will not persuade you to 
change your mind. Whichever side of the divide you have landed on, you will construct 
arguments to defend your position, but you should not mistake those post hoc rationalisations 
for your true reasons. It was this impasse that sparked Pascal’s most notorious theological 
gambit: his wager. 
The wager had in fact already been around for at least a century, having first been 
popularised by the rationalist Protestant radical Faustus Socinus.16 Its crude form warned 
atheists that they stood to gain nothing if they were right, but risked eternal damnation in Hell 
if they were wrong, and so urged them to believe out of raw self-interest. The problems with 
this crass argument were obvious, not least that it proposed a nakedly pragmatic ‘faith’ that 
hardly deserves the name. Pascal adapted it not to browbeat atheists, but as a thought-
experiment for those paralysed by the impossibility of certainty. There may or may not be a 
God, he concedes.  
<Q> 
                                               
15 Pascal, Pensées, 28–9, 57, 135, 151, 182, 237; and see above, pp. XX-XX. 
16 Shagan, Birth of Modern Belief, 190; cf. Sheppard, Anti-Atheism in Early Modern England, 74. 
But to which view shall we be inclined? Reason cannot decide this question. Infinite 
chaos separates us. At the far end of this infinite distance a coin is being spun which 
will come down heads or tails. How will you wager? 
</Q> 
Perhaps you would prefer not to gamble? Too late: once you are born, ‘there is no choice, 
you are already committed’. But although the odds are utterly unknowable, the stakes are not, 
and so Pascal the mathematician can offer at least one kind of certainty. We are offered the 
chance to stake something temporary – our earthly lives – for something eternal. And even at 
vanishingly long odds, a rational gambler would risk any finite stake for a chance of an 
infinite reward.17 
It is a clever, bloodless argument. Pascal does not expect anyone to be persuaded by 
it. Quite the opposite: he is very clear about the futility of such arguments. His point is that 
unbelievers may accept his logic, may even ‘want to be cured of unbelief’, but even so find 
that true faith is beyond their reach. In which case, the answer is evidently not ‘multiplying 
proofs of God’s existence’ but recognising that ‘if you are unable to believe, it is because of 
your passions’. The wager, then, is a call not to conversion, but to self-examination. It 
confronts unbelievers with the fact that even a logically watertight reason to believe would 
not change their minds. It proves that we are immune to proof. In the end, for believer and 
unbeliever alike, ‘the heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing’.18 
 Pascal framed the problem brilliantly. By its nature, he could not solve it. His 
contemporaries, and his successors down to the present, are compelled to wager on a coin 
toss, or set of dice rolls, which we cannot see and at whose odds we can scarcely guess. And 
                                               
17 Pascal, Pensées, 122–3. 
18 Pascal, Pensées, 124–5, 127. 
so, like any real gambler, we wager not with our heads but with our hearts and our guts. What 
alternative is there? 
 As a forest of explicitly anti-religious arguments springs up from the later seventeenth 
century onwards, it can sometimes be difficult to see the wood for the trees, let alone to trace 
the subterranean currents of emotion that continued to nourish them. Still, we have already 
seen enough to know where to look. Our two intermingled streams of unbelief, anger and 
anxiety, both continued to flow, merging into a persistent moral force. There are so many and 
varied unbelieving voices in the centuries between then and now that any selection at all risks 
distortion. All we can do in the remaining pages is to listen to a handful of those voices, 
telling old stories in new ways. 
 That unbelief remained angry is unmistakable. There was mockery, which since the 
Renaissance (and before) had been an invaluable means of sidestepping difficult questions. If 
you can make religion look ridiculous, you are saved the trouble of either proving it false or 
proving something else true, and you reserve the option of covering your tracks by claiming 
that you were only joking. And making religion look ridiculous is sometimes so easy that it is 
irresistible. Charles Blount, an English deist of the late seventeenth century, would eventually 
go on to write openly against Christianity, but he began with an anonymous work, Anima 
Mundi (1679), whose ‘defence’ of the immortality of the soul was deliberately framed to 
make it look absurd. A more mischievous and explosive joke was played by Johann Joachim 
Müller, grandson of a renowned Lutheran anti-atheist who, so rumour claimed, had once seen 
or perhaps even owned a copy of the mythical Of the Three Impostors. In 1688 young Müller 
was invited to take part in an academic debate by Johann Friedrich Mayer, an ultra-orthodox 
Lutheran pastor in Kiel whose own interest in Of the Three Impostors verged on the 
obsessive. It was too much to resist. In his presentation in Kiel, Müller electrified the 
audience by quoting from the notorious, imaginary book. On his departure, he left behind a 
gift for Mayer: a copy of the manuscript for which the Christian world had been hunting for 
so long. Mayer believed it was authentic, and knowing how dangerous it was, kept it close. 
Copies only began to circulate widely after his death in 1712. Müller had of course concocted 
the whole thing, and eventually admitted as much. Still, it was more than just a throwaway 
prank. The book fits into a long-standing culture among German law students of writing 
absurdist spoofs, such as a notorious ‘debate’ nearly a century earlier about whether or not 
women were human. Those students had not seriously been denying women’s humanity, any 
more than Müller was seriously denouncing Christ as an impostor. But you do not play jokes 
like that unless you think they are funny. At the least, you want your audience to laugh rather 
than to be outraged. Very likely you want them to wonder, if only for a moment, whether you 
are right.19 
 Spoofing religion has remained a constant theme of unbelief down to the present. The 
most famous example is probably still Voltaire’s Dr Pangloss, whose ‘metaphysico-theology-
cosmolonigology’ convinced him that the world is as perfect as could be, and even that his 
own syphilis was a price worth paying so that the world might have cochineal. The modern 
era’s most compelling literary meditation on belief and unbelief, Dostoevsky’s The Brothers 
Karamazov, has a neat example of the genre, put into the mouth of the debauched father, 
Fyodor Karamazov, who admits blithely that he expects to be dragged down to Hell with 
hooks when he dies: 
<Q> 
And then I think: hooks? Where do they get them? What are they made of? Iron? 
Where do they forge them? Have they got some kind of factory down there? You 
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know, in the monastery the monks probably believe there’s a ceiling in hell, for 
instance. Now me, I’m ready to believe in hell, only there shouldn’t be any ceiling; 
that would be, as it were, more refined, more enlightened, more Lutheran.20 
</Q> 
Even in nineteenth-century Russia, ‘Lutheran’ could be a code word for ‘half-atheist’. It is a 
straight line from here to the flowering of religious mockery in modern times, which has 
given us Alan Bennett’s ‘Take a Pew’ in Beyond the Fringe, Monty Python’s Life of Brian, 
and the incomparable Father Ted: more merry absurdism and gentle ridicule than vicious 
satire, but containing occasional, unmistakable flashes of real anger. 
 As ever, the primary target of that anger is not God himself, but his earthly 
representatives. The anticlericalism which animated unbelievers from the Middle Ages to 
Herbert, Hobbes and Spinoza has remained an engine of atheism down to the present, and not 
everyone finds the subject funny. The ‘infamous thing’ which Voltaire’s motto ‘écrasez 
l'infâme’ demanded must be crushed was the deadening and sometimes deadly power of the 
clergy. The real problem with a tyrannical conception of God, he warned, was that it ‘invites 
men to become tyrants’ in his name. The same mood is even plainer in Thomas Paine’s The 
Age of Reason (1794), the first anti-Christian bestseller, a book said to have triggered Bible-
burning parties on both sides of the Atlantic. Paine’s fury was directed not at God, but at 
churches, which he called 
<Q> 
human inventions, set up to terrify and enslave mankind, and monopolize power and 
profit. ... I do not believe in the creed professed by the Jewish Church, by the Roman 
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Church, by the Greek Church, by the Turkish Church, by the Protestant Church, nor 
by any church that I know of. My own mind is my own church. 
</Q> 
That was not a metaphysical position; in fact, beneath it all, Paine’s substantial religious 
views were surprisingly conventional. It was, as befits one of the heralds of the American 
revolution, a declaration of independence. And it is a sentiment we can imagine Christopher 
Marlowe expressing two hundred years earlier.21 
 Two notorious nineteenth-century examples tell the same story. Thomas Huxley is 
now best known as ‘Darwin’s bulldog’, although the myth of his triumph over the hapless 
bishop of Oxford in a debate over evolution in 1860 has grown in the telling. Huxley was 
certainly more outspoken on religious matters than Charles Darwin himself, and famously 
coined the term ‘agnostic’ to describe the scientific unbelief he advocated. But he was also an 
odd, and very English, kind of unbeliever. The opposite of agnosticism, as he saw it, was not 
Christianity, theism or religion as such, but ‘Ecclesiasticism, or . . . Clericalism’. He despised 
Bishop Wilberforce’s title and his officiousness at least as much as his opinions. Remarkably, 
Huxley claimed to be defending ‘the foundation of the Protestant Reformation’, by which he 
meant the ‘conviction of the supremacy of private judgement’ – in contrast to the ‘effete and 
idolatrous sacerdotalism’ which he believed had overtaken the Church of England in his own 
age.22 That was not at all what the first Protestant Reformers had thought they were doing, 
but Huxley did have a point. He was deploying the same merciless scepticism which the 
Reformers had weaponised and popularised, and against their traditional targets. 
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 Huxley’s much less respectable contemporary Mikhail Bakunin, the Russian anarchist 
and revolutionary, had a very different perspective but strikingly similar concerns. His essay 
‘God and the State’, written during the revolutionary false dawn of the Paris Commune in 
1871, boils with rage at ‘every religious system’ ever invented. Their ‘very nature and 
essence . . . is the impoverishment, enslavement and annihilation of humanity for the benefit 
of divinity’. And so his fury turned first of all to the slavemasters who had perpetrated this 
crime: ‘Whoever says revelation says revealers, messiahs, prophets, priests and legislators 
inspired by God himself. . . . All men owe them passive and unlimited obedience; for . . . 
against the justice of God no terrestrial justice holds. Slaves of God, men must also be slaves 
of Church and State.’ 
One result was that Bakunin, like Huxley and Fyodor Karamazov, could not help but 
insert himself into the unending conflict between Catholic and Protestant. For him, the 
essence of religion was to enslave humanity to priests. So he concluded, with wonderfully 
circular logic: ‘That is why Christianity is the absolute religion, the final religion; why the 
Apostolic and Roman Church is the only consistent, legitimate, and divine church.’ Since 
Catholicism alone had truly embraced religion’s tyrannical destiny, it was the only religion he 
saw as a worthy enemy. Protestants and theological liberals, ‘honest but timid souls’ whose 
God ‘is a nebulous, illusory being that vanishes into nothing at the first attempt to grasp it’, 
were beneath his contempt. Like a great many atheist (and anti-atheist) campaigners before 
and since, Bakunin anointed his most extreme and caricatured opponents as the only ones 
who needed to be taken seriously, thus avoiding any risk of engaging with people whose 
more subtle or inconvenient ideas might deviate from the scripts he had written for them.23 
 In all these cases, the charge was not that clergy were peddling foolish notions of an 
imaginary God. It was that they were using those notions in order to subjugate, exploit and 
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oppress the people. This was not about metaphysics; it was about wealth and power, and the 
critique was moral, not philosophical. It was in line with the traditional Protestant critique of 
clerical power, which Protestant radicals had quickly turned onto the new Protestant 
establishments. And its moral framework was straightforwardly Christian. These critics did 
not merely observe that churches oppress their people, or follow Machiavelli in seeing this as 
a shrewd and prudent tactic. They believed that for the strong and cunning to oppress the 
weak and simple is wrong. 
 If they did turn their anger from the clergy to God himself, they did so in the same 
vein. Paine’s The Age of Reason did not attack the Bible chiefly by amassing textual and 
historical problems with it, but by declaring it morally unfit for purpose: 
<Q> 
Whenever we read the obscene stories, the voluptuous debaucheries, the cruel and 
tortuous executions, the unrelenting vindictiveness, with which more than half the 
Bible is filled, it would be more consistent that we called it the word of a demon than 
the Word of God. It is a history of wickedness that has served to corrupt and brutalize 
mankind. 
</Q> 
Like Richard Dawkins’ pithy claim that ‘the God of the Old Testament is arguably the most 
unpleasant character in all fiction’, this works by measuring the Bible against an agreed 
moral standard and finding it wanting – that standard, certainly in Paine’s case, being derived 
from the Christian tradition itself. As a self-confessed deist, Paine found the Bible 
blasphemous: it defamed God by portraying him as morally deficient. One of the most 
common stumbling blocks for Christian belief in modern times – the traditional doctrine of 
Hell – worked in the same way. It triggered a moral intuition that God simply could not 
consign a part of his creation to eternal torment. This intuition did not refute the formidable 
logic of Augustinian or Calvinist theology: it bypassed it. The result has sometimes been 
materialism or some other mortalist doctrine, but equally often it has been forms of 
Christianity that reject Hell, or beliefs like spiritualism, which allows for immortality without 
Hell and which had a powerful appeal in the early twentieth century.24 
 Again, at the apogee of this moral anger, we find Bakunin. He recognised that the 
problem of the clergy could not be separated from the problem of God. If they really were 
God’s representatives, then they truly would be entitled to enslave humanity. Some writers 
would have sidestepped at this point into some logical argument that there is no God, but 
Bakunin recognised that this would be dishonest, and confronted the issue head on: 
<Q> 
If God existed, only in one way could he serve human liberty – by ceasing to exist . . . 
I reverse the phrase of Voltaire, and say that, if God really existed, it would be 
necessary to abolish him. 
</Q> 
On the surface, this is ridiculous: a fulfilment of all the accusations that atheism is a form of 
wishful thinking. Bakunin’s syllogism – ‘If God is, man is a slave; now, man can and must be 
free; then, God does not exist’ – absurdly derives a metaphysical claim from a political 
opinion. He is a new Canute, not merely ordering the tide to turn but the entire sea to dry 
up.25 But on a deeper level, this is good moral theology. God is by definition good. But the 
existence of a God is (Bakunin believes) inherently oppressive and therefore evil. Therefore 
the very concept of God is self-contradictory. If you accept his premisses, the case is 
watertight. Once again, however, among those premisses is a very particular moral 
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framework, which presumes liberty is an absolute good and subjugation an absolute evil. 
How far that framework is itself of Christian origin is not especially important. The point is 
that this is how the atheism of anger works. It is only when its moral standards come into 
conflict with God that God has to be abolished. 
 
 
<A>From Then to Now, II: Anxiety 
 
Alongside, and intertwined with, the unbelief of anger remains the unbelief of anxiety. The 
seventeenth century’s agonised Puritan wrestlers with doubt have had countless successors: 
individuals who have not embraced the fierce certainties of dogmatic faith or of angry 
unbelief, who are not so much sitting on the fence as impaled on it. Sometimes these agonies 
have been resolved into more or less settled belief, or unbelief; sometimes doubters have 
withdrawn, exhausted, from the fray, and made some sort of peace with their uncertainties; 
sometimes those uncertainties have not been resolved at all. Many of these dramas are 
documented in a distinctively modern literary form, uniquely well suited to exploring 
characters’ inner turmoil: the novel. Religious anxieties burn through novels such as James 
Hogg’s astonishing Private Memoirs and Confessions of a Justified Sinner (1824), the works 
of George Eliot, or, again, Dostoevsky. The mother in The Brothers Karamazov who cannot 
control her doubts about immortality could have been airlifted directly to nineteenth-century 
Russia from seventeenth-century England: 
<Q> 
I think, all my life I’ve believed, and then I die, and suddenly there’s nothing . . . 
What, what will give me back my faith? . . . How can it be proved, how can one be 
convinced? Oh, miserable me! . . . I’m the only one who can’t bear it. It’s devastating, 
devastating!26 
</Q> 
Some achieve unbelief. Some have it thrust upon them. 
 But as we saw in Chapter 5, those who suffer these agonies are not merely passive. 
Very often they try to defend or refound their faith, holding on to its core while relinquishing 
what seems unnecessary or indefensible. This can make it difficult to distinguish between 
religion’s defenders and its adversaries. Spinoza is not the only iconic figure in the history of 
unbelief who was, at least in his own terms, a believer. Dominic Erdozain’s compelling 
history of anti-Christian thought argues that a whole series of these philosophers were in fact 
trying to purify Christianity, not to destroy it. Pierre Bayle, the French Enlightenment’s first 
great apostle of liberalism, scourge of attempts to use religion as a tool of social order, was 
trying to redeem Christianity from cruel distortions, not an atheist prudently maintaining a 
sham, residual faith. Voltaire echoed Spinoza by rejecting miracles on the grounds that ‘the 
universal theologian, that is, the true philosopher, sees that it is contradictory for nature to act 
on particular or single views’: that is a religious, not an atheistic conviction. Paine wrote his 
fierce critique of Christianity in The Age of Reason ‘lest in the general wreck of superstition, 
of false systems of government and false theology, we lose sight of morality, of humanity and 
of the theology that is true’.27 
 These thinkers had not rejected Christianity, nor were they unwilling to deal in its 
currency. They were, however, persuaded that that currency was devalued, and that the 
guarantees of the churches that claimed to stand behind it might no longer be sound. And as 
any banker knows, anxieties of that kind are intolerable, whether well founded or not. Rather 
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than trying to shore up faith in those old guarantors, these speculators attempted a bolder 
gambit: to rebase their religious currency entirely, founding it on the gold standard of natural 
law and morality rather than the churches’ dubious claims to authority. They believed that in 
doing so they were going back to Christianity’s true heart. 
Yet some of the results of this rebasing did not look very much like traditional 
Christianity. The Enlightenment era’s single most important philosopher, Immanuel Kant, 
was a convinced adherent of the new gold standard. His ‘categorical imperative’, which 
codified it, still underpins what much of the modern world thinks is self-evident moral 
common sense. Kant believed himself to be defending God, but where Montaigne had 
confined his God to an honoured and secluded cloister, ‘Kant built a fortress of conscience . . 
. that swore a rescued God to silence.’ In this system, as Erdozain puts it, ‘morality has 
swallowed religion’. Even Ludwig Feuerbach’s The Essence of Christianity (1841), one of 
the age’s bitterest moral critiques of religion in any form, belongs in the same tradition. By 
this stage, the battle for credulity has finally been lost and Christianity has eaten itself.28 
The culmination of this tradition is in Dostoevsky’s Brothers Karamazov, when the 
idealistic Ivan lays out his very distinctive form of unbelief. At first glance it looks like the 
classic argument from suffering: God could not permit suffering, but suffering exists, 
therefore there is no God. But this is not Ivan Karamazov’s argument. He does not deny God. 
He even accepts that in the end a higher good may come of suffering. His problem is simply 
that his moral intuition gags at the very idea: 
<Q> 
If the suffering of children goes to make up the sum of suffering needed to buy truth, 
then I assert beforehand that the whole of truth is not worth such a price. . . . Imagine 
that you yourself are building the edifice of human destiny with the object of making 
                                               
28 Erdozain, The Soul of Doubt, esp. 120, 228. 
people happy in the finale, of giving them peace and rest at last, but for that you must 
inevitably and unavoidably torture just one tiny creature, that same child who was 
beating her chest with her little fist, and raise your edifice on the foundation of her 
unrequited tears – would you agree to be the architect on such conditions? 
</Q> 
This is not unbelief; it is defiance. His brother Alyosha murmurs that it is ‘rebellion’. Ivan 
himself says, ‘It is not that I don’t accept God, Alyosha, I just most respectfully return him 
the ticket.’ He finds the universe ethically unacceptable. The God who made it this way is 
real enough, but Ivan wants nothing to do with him.29 
And yet, the gold standard against which Ivan Karamazov and all these other 
moralists were measuring their religion was Christian. Ivan himself could not have made it 
plainer. Having declared his wish to return his ticket, he launches into his parable of the 
Grand Inquisitor, in which a (Catholic) inquisitor, who we are explicitly told does not believe 
in God, berates an incognito Jesus at great length for the foolish impracticality of his morals 
before condemning him to die. Jesus remains silent throughout, but at the end ‘approaches the 
old man in silence and gently kisses him. . . . That is the whole answer.’30 Ivan is not clinging 
to Jesus’ moral authority while rejecting churches and doctrines. He is rejecting churches and 
doctrines because of, and by means of, Jesus’ moral authority. 
Dostoevsky may have given us the most memorable image of this clash between Jesus 
and religion, but as Erdozain points out, it was hardly original to him. Spinoza set a trend: 
unbelievers singling Jesus out for praise. Voltaire, especially later in life, treated Jesus with 
uncharacteristic reverence, as an archetype of true natural religion. Thomas Jefferson claimed 
to follow what he called ‘the Philosophy of Jesus’, saying that Jesus would not recognise a 
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single feature of the so-called Christianity erected in his name. Thomas Paine believed not 
only that ‘the morality [Jesus] preached and practised was of the most benevolent kind’, but 
that ‘it has not been exceeded by any’. These sceptics may not revere him as the incarnate 
Second Person of the Trinity, but they plainly see him as unique. John Stuart Mill, the 
nineteenth-century liberal whose atheism was undoubted, believed that ‘the authentic sayings 
of Jesus of Nazareth’ were not merely in ‘harmony with the intellect and feelings of every 
good man or woman’, but almost constituted true humanity: ‘That they should be forgotten, 
or cease to be operative on the human conscience, while human beings remain cultivated or 
civilized, may be pronounced, once for all, impossible.’31 
Perhaps some of these sentiments were insincere. If so, they were bowing to a cultural 
fact: for believers and unbelievers alike, Jesus Christ was by far the most potent moral figure 
in Western culture. Respectable radicals might question his divinity, but only a scoundrel like 
Nietzsche would question his morality. One raw index of this cultural power was the English 
fashion for literary ‘lives’ of Jesus started by John Seeley’s Ecce Homo (1865) and bolstered 
by a new wave of questions about the Bible’s reliability. Over the next forty years a 
staggering five thousand such ‘lives’ were published.32 If the late Victorian age was losing 
faith in Christianity, as plenty of Christians feared, it was certainly not losing interest in 
Christ. 
 One odd, backhanded testimony to Jesus’ cultural power is the persistence among a 
certain combative strain of atheism of a very odd belief: that Jesus of Nazareth never existed. 
Historically speaking, this claim is not impossible, but it is pretty implausible: in effect, it 
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requires the existence of a large-scale, entirely successful and oddly pointless conspiracy in 
the first century. But it is not and never has been intended as a sober historical claim. 
Napoleon, who is recorded as denying Jesus’ existence on several occasions, was not a 
scholar of ancient history. He simply had one of modern history’s most colossal egos, and 
resented kowtowing to the moral authority of a dead Galilean peasant. The case was made 
more substantially by Karl Marx’s scholarly mentor Bruno Bauer, perhaps the most serious 
historian ever to deny Jesus’ existence. Bauer took this stance because it fitted with his long-
standing anti-Christian views, and also with his anti-Semitism, which balked at accepting a 
Jewish prophet’s position at the heart of western civilisation. A simpler, although equally 
implausible solution to that particular problem was adopted by Adolf Hitler, who said in 
private conversation that ‘it’s certain that Jesus was not a Jew’ and in fact that ‘Jesus fought 
against the materialism of his age, and, therefore, against the Jews.’33 
In our own times, Jesus-denialism has found a more harmless home on the fringes of 
atheist subcultures. Books such as Kenneth Humphreys’ Jesus Never Existed (2005) or 
Joseph Atwill’s Caesar’s Messiah (2005) are openly anti-religious polemics or simple 
contrarianism rather than sober historical studies.34 What makes the determined pursuit of 
this argument interesting is that it is not only implausible: it is unnecessary. Denials of 
Christianity do not become weaker if you admit that Jesus of Nazareth existed, any more than 
denials of life on Mars become weaker if you admit that Mars exists. This fringe are 
following Napoleon by recognising that Christianity’s cultural power depends less on 
philosophical or theological claims than on Jesus’ moral authority. Atheism’s more level-
headed advocates in recent times have preferred to avoid engaging with Jesus at all. An 
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unusual exception is the novelist Philip Pullman’s The Good Man Jesus and the Scoundrel 
Christ (2010), an engaging fictionalised separation of the good, ethical Jesus from his bad, 
religious alter ego. Spinoza would have recognised the distinction. Even in our own times, it 
seems, the authority of Jesus of Nazareth remains a force to be reckoned with. Rather than 
critiquing or relativising his morals, Christianity’s opponents generally feel obliged to avoid 
him, to co-opt him by claiming his ethical mantle, or in extremis, to abolish him. 
<A>From Jesus to Hitler 
 
The wrestling match between belief and unbelief in the Western world has been a long one. 
Both parties have made numerous premature declarations of victory or defeat, but the 
struggle has repeatedly proved unpredictable. There is no knowing how things will turn next. 
Even so, since the mid-twentieth century, something has changed in Europe and North 
America. ‘Religion’, said an authoritative commentator on the United States in 1955, ‘has 
become part of the ethos of American life to such a degree that overt anti-religion is all but 
inconceivable.’ Western society was certainly very secular, as Christian commentators 
lamented, but Christianity continued to define its moral frameworks. And so virtually 
everyone continued to claim a residual identity as a Christian, apart from the few who had 
ancestral ties to Judaism or another religion. In the last half-century, that default, universal 
religious identity has broken down.  For the first time, substantial and fast-growing minorities 
who deny that they have any religion at all have appeared/ Even in the overtly pious United 
States, this is true of over a third of adults born since 1980.35 The minority of earnest and 
devout Christians may or may not be shrinking – the picture varies from place to place, and 
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certainly in the United States this group remains large and assertive – but the mass of nominal 
believers who have formed the majority in most ‘Christian’ societies for over a century seem 
rapidly to be shedding their skin. The change is above all a generational one. It seems 
increasingly plain that the 1960s – or the ‘long 1960s’ from around 1955 to 1975 – were an 
inflection point, when a new kind of secularism appeared in western culture.36 Why? 
 This book’s perspective suggests some answers. For a start, it is worth noticing what 
has not caused this secular surge. Angry unbelief has repeatedly over the past few centuries 
tried to confront or suppress religion, without much success. The first avowedly anti-
Christian movement of modern times, during the wild days of the first French Revolution, 
served simply to stoke some of the Revolution’s staunchest opposition. In the end Napoleon 
came to terms with the church whose founder he claimed never existed. Twentieth-century 
Communists’ official atheism had, at best, a mixed record of success. Most (not all) 
Communist regimes permitted some religious practice, hoping that religion would wither 
under the force of propaganda and discrimination so that it did not have to be forcibly 
uprooted. However, both legal and illegal religious movements often flourished under 
Communism and have returned to a prominent socio-political role in a number of post-
Communist societies. Even in open societies, campaigning, strident atheism has been no 
more obviously successful than campaigning, strident movements for religious renewal. In 
1925, a group of combative New York atheists founded the American Association for the 
Advancement of Atheism, with the aim of mounting a ‘direct frontal assault’ on religion. It 
generated a good deal of excitement and a number of local chapters, but the ‘assault’ did not 
result in any kind of breakthrough. Within a decade it had ceased to function. Like the so-
called ‘village atheists’ whose mulish nonconformity outraged nineteenth-century America; 
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like the rakish ‘Hellfire Clubs’ which so offended moralists in eighteenth-century England; 
like the libertines who supposedly thronged sixteenth-century Paris; and like the steady 
stream of blasphemers who passed through medieval church courts, these people were 
shocking but not threatening. They were a part of the moral equilibrium of a Christian 
society.37 Christianity has endured a good many ‘direct frontal assaults’ in the past few 
centuries. They have not proved very effective. If anything, the period since the 1950s has 
been distinguished by the absence of substantial, coordinated anti-religious campaigns. The 
example of the so-called ‘New Atheist’ movement spearheaded by Richard Dawkins, 
Christopher Hitchens and their fellow ‘horsemen’ in the 2000s suggests that, even now, such 
campaigns are much better at cheering up atheists than at persuading believers. 
 Nor does the post-1960s secular turn reflect a contemporaneous collapse in the 
intellectual case for religion. The ‘New Atheists’ and most of their fellow-travellers are 
happy to present themselves as heirs to the Enlightenment critique of religion, or of the 
nineteenth century’s set-piece debates about science. Not much about this case is 
substantially new, aside from a psychological and neurological dimension. If anything, the 
humanist-materialist argument against Christianity has weakened over the past century. At 
the turn of the twentieth century, an educated lay person in Europe or North America might 
have been expected to believe that the universe is infinitely old and entirely deterministic; 
that humanity’s ‘races’ are fundamentally different from one another; that the process of 
evolution is governed by some sort of progressive life force; that the New Testament is a 
collection of myths created some centuries after the events it claims to describe, and the Old 
Testament a mere collage of stories shared by peoples across the entire ancient Near East. All 
those beliefs are inimical to traditional Christianity, and a century on, none of them have 
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stood the test of time.38 If Christianity has disintegrated intellectually, it happened a long time 
ago, not during the 1960s. 
 So if religion has neither collapsed nor been crushed, what has been happening to it? 
Historians of the 1960s describe a series of tectonic social changes, from the decline of 
collective identities in increasingly individualistic societies, to the momentous changes in 
gender roles and in sexual mores that accompanied second-wave feminism, the contraceptive 
pill and the rise of women’s paid employment. However, the most recent study by one of the 
most trenchant of these historians goes further. Callum Brown’s remarkable book Becoming 
Atheist is an oral history of modern unbelief, based on interviews with eighty-five adult 
atheists across Europe and North America. It is impossible to read his account and deny that 
religiosity in the Western world has undergone an epochal shift during his interviewees’ 
lifetimes. 
 Brown’s people and their stories are enormously varied, but he observes that they 
share a remarkably consistent ethical code. That code has two key elements. First is the so-
called ‘golden rule’ of treating others as you would like to be treated – a Christian imperative, 
but not, as Brown points out, an exclusively Christian one. Then there is a linked set of 
principles about human equality and bodily and sexual autonomy. Brown calls this ethical 
framework ‘humanism’, a term which relatively few of his interviewees volunteered, but 
which all of them were happy to embrace when offered the chance.39 
<Q> 
 What makes this interesting is that Brown’s interviewees claimed 
without exception, that they were ‘humanists’ before they discovered the term. 
Humanism was neither a philosophy nor an ideology that they had learned or read 
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about and then adopted. There was no act of conversion, no training or induction . . . 
A humanist condition precedes being a self-conscious humanist.40 
</Q> 
This ‘humanism’ was not a manifesto they had embraced, much less a programme imposed 
on them. Those of them who had grown up in religious settings had embraced this ethic 
before they broke with their religion. When the breaking point did come, it was either 
because of a conflict between their religious and their humanist ethics, or because their 
humanist ethics made their religion appear redundant. The implication is that, in the West 
since the mid-twentieth century, growing numbers of earnestly or nominally religious people 
have adopted an ethic which is independent of their religion, and is in some tension with it: so 
they have either drifted away from or consciously rejected their religion. This account, with 
ethics as its driving force, meshes with the story we have been tracing since the seventeenth 
century. 
So where did this diffuse, ubiquitous ethic come from? If Brown’s humanists did not 
even consciously adopt their ethics, how did they reach such a consistently shared position? 
Brown – a proud humanist himself – suggests that it may arise from ‘within human 
experience’, indeed that ‘reason alone may construct humanism’: an echo of the old argument 
for God from universal human consensus. It is an appealing idea, but it is demonstrably false. 
Modern humanism is, perhaps unfortunately, in no sense an expression of universal human 
values. Its ethical markers – gender and racial equality, sexual freedom, a strong doctrine of 
individual human rights, a sharp distinction between the human and non-human realms – are, 
in a long historical perspective, very unusual indeed. Nor do they stand on a very firm logical 
base, as anyone who has ever tried philosophically to prove the existence of human rights 
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knows. The fact that those values appear intuitively obvious to Brown, and indeed to me, is 
not an answer. It is the problem.41 
 Brown does, however, observe that the dominance of these values in Western culture 
can be dated to 1945, and in particular to ‘the notion of human rights which emerged from the 
Second World War’.42 As well as being the most catastrophic war in human history, the 
Second World War and in particular the Nazi genocide was the defining moral event of our 
age, which reset our culture’s notions of good and evil. By the early twentieth century, 
Christianity’s only undisputed role in Western society, its raison d’être, was to define 
morality. This is precisely what it failed to do in the Second World War, the modern era’s 
most intense moral test. It failed not only in the sense that many churches and Christians were 
to a degree complicit with Nazism and fascism, but in the wider sense that the global crisis 
revealed that Christianity’s moral priorities were wrong. It now seemed plain that cruelty, 
discrimination and murder were evil in a way that fornication, blasphemy and impiety were 
not. 
As the post-war generations digested these lessons, they turned the war into the 
Western world’s foundation myth. Cultural conservatives sometimes worry that modern 
Western societies lack shared sacred narratives, but this is not exactly true. In the same way 
that Victorian publishers endlessly retold the life of Jesus, post-war films, novels and other 
media endlessly retold and retell the Second World War. It is the story to which we 
continually return. Its history retains an unparalleled grip on our imagination because it is our 
Paradise Lost: our age’s defining battle with evil. 
 Once the most potent moral figure in Western culture was Jesus Christ. Believer or 
unbeliever, you took your ethical bearings from him, or professed to. To question his morals 
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was to expose yourself as a monster. Now, the most potent moral figure in Western culture is 
Adolf Hitler. It is as monstrous to praise him as it would once have been to disparage Jesus. 
He has become the fixed reference point by which we define evil. The humanist ethic which 
Brown summarises is almost a precisely inverted image of Nazism. In the seventeenth 
century, arguments tended to end with someone calling someone else ‘atheist’, marking the 
point at which the discussion hit a brick wall. In our own times, as Godwin’s Law notes, the 
final, absolute and conversation-ending insult is to call someone a Nazi. This is neither an 
accident nor a marker of mental laziness. It reflects that fact that Nazism, almost alone in our 
relativistic culture, is an absolute standard: a point where argument ends, because whether it 
is good or evil is not up for debate. Or again, while Christian imagery, crosses and crucifixes 
have lost much of their potency in our culture, there is no visual image which now packs as 
visceral an emotional punch as a swastika. 
 The plainest evidence that Nazism has crossed the barrier separating historical events 
from timeless truths is the way it has permeated the modern age’s most popular myths. To 
many people it is incongruous, even embarrassing, that the twentieth century’s bestselling 
work of fiction is an excessively long, unapologetically archaic and sometimes self-indulgent 
fairy tale written by a philologist who was a very traditional Catholic, and whose most 
devoted readers were and remain teenage boys. But even if you share the now-receding 
literary disdain for J. R. R. Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings, there is no gainsaying its cultural 
importance. Tolkien himself had no patience for allegory as a literary form, and vigorously 
denied that he had written one, but if the War of the Ring does not mirror the Second World 
War which was raging as he wrote the book, it certainly refracts it, and he privately admitted 
as much. Tolkien was an early and staunch opponent of Nazism in general and Nazi racial 
ideology in particular, in part because he felt the Nazi appropriation of his beloved Nordic 
mythology as a personal affront. But while he never doubted the righteousness of the Allies’ 
cause, he was also a veteran of the Battle of the Somme, and knew that this war was, like any 
war, ‘an ultimately evil job’: so he told his son in 1944. And he used his own developing 
myth to explain what he meant: not only that there were ‘a great many Orcs on our side’, but 
that ‘we are attempting to conquer Sauron with the Ring’. Such a war might end in victory, 
but a victory whose effect would be ‘to breed new Saurons’.43 
 Whatever we make of that as a political judgement, as a cultural prophecy it has 
proved uncannily prescient. Western culture has been breeding new Saurons ever since. The 
figure of the Dark Lord has stalked through the most persistent and popular mythologies of 
the post-war era, from Star Wars’ Darth Vader to Harry Potter’s Lord Voldemort. The debt 
these ersatz Hitlers owe to their real-world archetype is sometimes implied, sometimes 
openly acknowledged, but always plain. These are the myths on which generations of 
children in the post-Christian West have been raised, transposing the brutal lesson of the 
Second World War into timeless morality tales. It is a lesson our culture seems determined to 
teach itself and eager repeatedly to relearn: that this is what true evil looks like, even though 
in reality evil rarely appears in such unambiguous dress. And while the Christian ethical 
sensibility which Tolkien embodied still underpins these myths, they have, like the culture in 
which they have thrived, left that original taproot behind them. 
 And this is where the emotional history of unbelief currently stands in what used to be 
Christendom. Perhaps we still believe that God is good, but we believe with more fervour and 
conviction that Nazism is evil. In post-war humanism, the centuries-old Christian moral 
revolt against Christianity has finally kicked over the traces and renounced its residual 
connection to Christian ethics. Or at least, it has tried to. Since this humanism has emerged 
by processes of intuition rather than of conscious reasoning – since its history is, inevitably, 
an emotional history – it cannot rid itself of its ancestry quite so easily. It has become almost 
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commonplace to point out that ‘secular thought is mostly composed of repressed religion’ 
and that humanism continues to be shaped by Christian moral norms. Combative atheists 
deplore this and opportunistic Christians celebrate it, but they are agreed about the fact.44 It 
could hardly be otherwise. In this sense, the old struggle between belief and unbelief is not 
over. It has simply entered a new phase. 
 Still, a new phase it is. Breaking our moral currency’s last links to the old gold 
standard of Christian ethics is unprecedented. Perhaps gold standards are in the end no more 
rational than any other coin, but underwriting our moral currency with the anti-Nazi narrative 
instead of with Christianity is an experiment. It is not clear how well or how long that 
narrative will be able to bear the burden it has been asked to carry. If we are going to choose 
a historical reference point for absolute evil, then Nazism is certainly hard to beat; but as the 
Second World War falls off the edge of living memory, will the old stories and convictions 
retain their power? Are moral myths we have distilled from them, heady as they are, capable 
of nourishing an enduring ethical sensibility? Will the lessons we have learned from them 
continue to seem intuitively and self-evidently true? The stirrings of authoritarian nationalism 
around the world suggest not. The readiness of some of those nationalists to claim pop-
culture myths for themselves – Tolkien’s mythology is all too open to racial categories which 
are, literally, dehumanising45 – is a warning that emotive myth-making is a game all sides can 
play. If the common coin of our shared morals comes into increasing question, with contested 
histories and myths being reduced to scraps of paper, we will have little to underpin our 
collective ethics on except intuition – unless another shared experience, with luck one less 
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terrible than the Second World War, provides renewed values against which our currency can 
be rebased. 
 Two things at least are clear. First, Western Christendom is not about to snap back 
into place. The contemporary humanist surge is not a blip or an anomaly, but a continuation 
of moral forces that have been at work within the Christian world for centuries. Believers 
hoping it will go away and normal service will be resumed are deluding themselves. Indeed, 
they are in some danger of being tempted by authoritarian nationalist voices that want to 
unlearn the Second World War’s moral lessons. When such voices say ‘Christian’, they mean 
a tribal identity rather than a universal ethic. That is not merely repugnant. It is self-defeating. 
Western culture sloughed off this kind of seductive, compromised religion for a reason, and 
would if necessary probably do so again. In the meantime, religions that dig their heels in to 
oppose the new moral environment risk taking on the role of medieval blasphemers: to 
validate a majority culture by offering it exactly the kind of predictable opposition it craves. 
The religions that will prosper in this environment will be those that work with the grain of 
humanist ethics, while finding ways to offer something that humanism cannot. 
Second, the humanist surge is not a stable new reality either. The intuitions which 
make it possible will not flow peacefully, steadily and indefinitely. Our cultures’ moral 
frameworks have shifted before and they will do so again. Our beliefs will, inevitably, follow. 
Believers and unbelievers alike share an interest in how that story ends.
 
